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SUMMARY 
 
This is first of its kind empirical study on the costs of terrorism on Pakistan’s exports. The 
analysis finds that intensity of terrorist activity can be divided into three distinct periods. The 
LAL Masjid incident in mid 2007 marks the first sign of intensification of terrorism in Pakistan. 
The second one is the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. The third one comes in 2008 when the 
US announced to shift gear from Iraq to Afghanistan and incumbent government in Pakistan 
created a political support for armed action within Pakistani borders against the terrorists. The 
analysis finds that terrorism has more significant affect on Pakistani exports post Benazir 
assassination. The report calculates the monthly and daily costs of terrorism. On average there 
are 2 terrorist attacks every day whereas 5 citizens on average die in these attacks. A single 
terrorist attack costs 12 million dollars to the exports. Post Benazir assassination the costs rise 
to 18 million dollars due to increased intensity where not only the death toll on average has 
risen but the number of terrorist attacks have gone up. Average per month loss in exports due 
to terrorism is calculated to be around 500 million dollars. Pakistan in 2006-09 has lost nearly 
30 billion dollars in exports as its market shares have fallen. Part of this loss is explained by 
terrorism, where we find that 18 billion dollars accounts for it. Please note that extending the 
data for later years may make our results more pronounced but suffice to say our calculated β’s 
are robust capable of predicting terrorism for coming years. For example, it is found out that 
costs of number of deaths and number of injured are different while  exports are more sensitive 
to the former capturing severity of casualties that is the hall mark of extreme terrorist actions 
like suicide attacks.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Current collapse of Pakistan’s economic growth rates challenge the economic prosperity 
achieved during 2003-2006 period. In Pakistan’s case, it was rather clear. With intensification of 
war on terror (WOT) post 2006, Pakistan is currently witnessing yet more challenging economic 
circumstances. Though, the exogenous factors which relate to current economic situation are 
generally associated with rise in oil prices, energy crises, global financial crises and commodity 
price hike, there is need also to include factors like WOT into the paradigm. Armed conflict 
within a country also affects the economic potential of the country.  
 
It has been nearly a decade now that Pakistan had been participating in the WOT as a front line 
ally. The conflict has deepened the structural problems within different sectors of Pakistan’s 
economy.  Recently there has been some efforts made in the international literature to 
associate global shocks like oil price shock, financial meltdown in USA, sub prime mortgage 
crises in USA, and global recession to WOT - especially armed conflict initiated by USA in Iraq 
which was an extension of WOT in Afghanistan.  Likewise, there is a need to revisit the reasons 
for Pakistan’s current economic downturn and asses the role played by the ongoing WOT.  In 
recent years Pakistan’s participation in WOT has deepened with more visible armed action in 
Pakistani Northern provinces. So much so that Pakistan ranks close to Sri Lanka and Nepal in 
incurring costs of terrorism while both the later countries have precedence of armed conflict 
and civil war spanning decades.   
 
Table 1.1  Costs of Terrorism 
 
 Rank 
 
Costs 
 
 
Pakistan 
 
India 
 
China 
 
Bangladesh 
 
Sri Lanka 
 
Nepal 
1. The incidence of violence (1= 
imposes significant cost on 
business, 7= does not impose 
significant costs on business), 
2007, 2008 
 
99 
(3.7) 
47 
(5.2) 
50 
(5.1) 
93 
(3.9) 
84 
(4.2) 
109 
(3.2) 
2. Business costs of terrorism 
(1=imposes significant costs to 
businesses, 7= does not impose 
significant costs to businesses), 
2007, 2008 
 
118 
(3.7) 
94 
(5.0) 
79 
(5.3) 
102 
(4.6) 
120 
(3.0) 
119 
(3.0) 
Source: The Global Enabling Trade Report 2009 
  
Incidents of terrorism, political violence and insurgency continued to haunt peace and stability 
in South Asian region. The militant related casualties, including dead and injured rose from 23, 
098 in 2008 to 61,142 in 2009. The more than double fold increase in casualties in South Asia 
was due to Pakistan’s three major military operations in FATA and NWFP during 2009. Pakistan 
suffered maximum number of casualties followed by Sri Lanka as is shown in table 1.2.  
 
 
Table 1.2  Militancy Related Casualties 
 
 
Country 
 
Militancy-related Casualties 
 
Pakistan 
 
25,447 
Sri Lanka 23,309 
Afghanistan 8,812 
India 3,364 
Nepal 210 
Total 61,142 
Source: Pakistan Security Report, 2009 
 
 
 
1.1. Intensification of WOT: A Post 2007 Scenario: 
 
Following kidnapping of civilians and foreigners in the heart of Islamabad, it was on July 3, 2007 
that the Lal Mosque students tried to snatch arms and wireless sets from the security forces 
deployed around the mosque and attacked them.  The operation launched afterwards by the 
security forces on Lal Mosque left 134 people dead and 200 others injured. The incident was 
followed by two violent suicide attacks in the capital, killing at least 34 persons including 8 
policemen and wounding another 125 persons.  This was the start of the intensification of WOT 
in Pakistan as by the end of 2007 there were already 6 suicide attacks in Islamabad and 
neighboring Rawalpindi  targeting Pakistani security forces and civilians. Alongside Maulana 
Fazlullah representing Pakistan Tehrik Taliban (PTT) in Swat took control of the district through 
a volunteer force and established his own Shariat court. TTP has been known to have close 
cross border ties with other terrorist networks, including Al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan.  
Violence by TTP lead to another concentrated operation by security forces in Swat district. 
Resultantly, security forces were frequently targeted and kidnapped in NWFP and FATA.  
 
Years 2008 and 2009 were marked with increased terrorist attacks in the country as well as 
active armed action against the militants in multiple regions. Military operations in Malakand 
region, South Waziristan, Khyber and other parts of FATA are more notable ones. While 
terrorist attacks on military’s General Headquarter in Rawalpindi, Sri Lankan cricket team and 
Manawan Police Training Center in Lahore revealed the growing ability of terrorists to strike 
any target at will. Militants’ network in South Punjab, drone attacks in Tribal areas, killing of 
Baitullah Mehsud, chief of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan,  a surge in the number of NATO and 
US troops in Afghanistan are other highlights of WOT in Pakistan. Overall there has been a 
phenomenal rise in terrorist attacks in Pakistan since 2007 as can be seen in table 1.3. 
 
 
Table 1.3  Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan 
 
Year Total Attacks Annual Increase 
since 2006 
Killed Injured 
2006 675  907 1,543 
2007 1,503 123 % 3,448 5,353 
2008 2,577 282 % 7,997 9,670 
2009 3,816 465 % 12,632 12,815 
Source: Pakistan Security Report, 2009 
 
Terrorists have used various violent means to attack. They comprise of suicide attacks, rocket 
attacks, beheadings, remote–control bombs, kidnappings, landmines, shootings, sabotage, 
targeted killings, bomb blasts, hand grenades and improvised explosive devices. The incidence 
of target killings and attacks through hand grenades have more than doubled in 2009 when 
compared to 2008. Suicide attacks, kidnappings and remote control bomb blasts have also seen 
remarkable increase in the span of  last one year.  
 
Table 1.4  Attack types 
 
 
Tactic 
 
No. of Incidents 
 
 2008 2009 Growth (%) 
 
Suicide attacks 
 
63 
 
87 
 
38.09 
Rocket attacks 381 422 10.76 
Beheadings 46 49 6.52 
Remote controlled bombs 112 189 68.75 
Kidnappings 116 174 50 
Landmines 110 111 0.90 
Shooting/firing 451 568 25.94 
Sabotage/fire/torched 116 89 -23.27 
Targeted Killing 26 82 215.38 
Bomb blasts 298 341 14.42 
Hand grenades 82 219 167.07 
Improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs) 
373 355 -4.82 
Source: Pakistan Security Report, 2009 
 
 
1.2. Suicide Attacks: A Major Terror Tactic 
 
Suicide attacks have been increasingly used by terrorists as a major terror tactic. In 2009, there 
is a steep rise of suicide attacks all over Pakistan. The major concentration of attacks in 2007 
was in NWFP. In 2009, NWFP remained the worst hit region with total number of suicide 
attacks reaching to 52, whereas Punjab/Islamabad also witnessed a sharp increase in attacks 
counting to hefty number of 23. Out of 23, 8 attacks occurred only in the capital city of 
Islamabad. These suicide attacks targeted civilians as well as security personnel. Table 1.6 in at 
the end of the section gives detailed summary of the targets of suicide attacks. In 2009, most 
suicide attacks were targeted towards the security forces comprising of either police or army 
personnel. Attacks were also carried out on NATO supplies.  
 
Table 1.5 Province Wise Suicide Attacks 
 
Administrative Entity No. of Suicide Attacks 
 2007 2009 
NWFP 33 52 
Punjab/Islamabad 11 23 
FATA 11 7 
Balochistan 4 2 
Azad Kashmir - 2 
Sindh 1 1 
   
Total 60 87 
Source: Pakistan Security Report, 2007 and 2009 
 
1.3. Drone Strikes and Attacks on NATO supplies 
 
51 US drone attacks were reported in 2009, which killed 667 people and injured 310. The major 
concentration of attacks were in South and North Waziristan targeting key Al-Qaeda and 
Taliban commanders which include Baitullah Mehsud, chief of TTP, Hakimullah Mehsud, chief 
of TTP after Baitullah Mehsud, Tahir Yuldushev, chief of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 
Nazimuddin Zalallov alias Yahyo and Usama Al-Kini of Al Qaeda. . However, many civilians have 
also been killed in these attacks.  
 
A total of 25 attacks were recorded on NATO forces out of which 15 took place in the NWFP and 
10 in FATA. Most of the attacks were reported along the Jamrud-Torkhum highway border area 
and the outskirts of Peshawar.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.7. Attacks on NATO supplies in FATA and NWFP 
 
 
Month 
 
Attacks in NWFP 
 
Attacks in FATA 
January 3 0 
February 1 3 
March 1 2 
April 4 0 
May 2 1 
June 0 0 
July 1 3 
August 1 2 
September 0 1 
October 1 0 
November 1 0 
December 0 0 
Total 15 12 
                                     Source: Pakistan Security Report, 2009 
 
1.4. Attacks on Schools: 
 
Despite recent rise in terrorist attacks, the intensification of armed action by security forces 
against militants in Pakistan was supported by the masses because Taliban not only waged war 
against the state but also Pakistani society at large and women in particular. For instance, 
incidents of Taliban militants torching girls’ schools grew as Taliban banned girls’ education 
altogether. Initially, militants warned against sending girls to schools but later resorted to 
directly attacking girls’ schools especially in NWFP and FATA where they destroyed around 100 
schools. Only in 2008, Taliban targeted 119 educational institutions, out of which 111 were 
girls’. In 2009, Taliban targeted both boys’ and girls’ schools more intensely in NWFP and FATA 
where 54 girl’s schools and colleges were destroyed while 86 boy’s schools were attacked.  
 
 
Table 1.8. Attacks on Schools and Colleges in NWFP and FATA (2009) 
 
 NWFP FATA 
 Girls Boys Girls Boys 
Attacks 40 52 14 34 
Source: Pakistan Security Report, 2009 
 
 
1.5. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): 
Continued violence and increased terrorist activities and attacks on civilians resulted in mass 
displacement of populations in FATA and NWFP.  More than 300,000 persons have been 
displaced, hence stifling the whole socio economic structure of the region.  
 
 
 
 Table 1.8 Costs of IDP’s 
 
Persons Migrated 310,000 
Relief Camps Established 12 
No. of IDPs Living in Camps 61,180 
Houses destroyed / damaged 38,750 
Approximate cost of repair Rs 500,000 per house 
Daily expenditure per head on food & facilities US$ 1.875 
Total Cost of Rebuilding US$ 232 Million 
Daily Cost of IDPs US$ 114.7 Million 
Cost of Enhanced Security Infrastructure US$ 6.1 Billion 
Source: Ministry of Planning Estimates (2009) 
1.6. Disaster Management: 
 
Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) has been active to cater to the increased 
demand of resources to mitigate negative fallout of the conflict in NWFP and FATA. A US$ 1 
billion fund has been created by PDMA for this purpose, which in addition to other sectors also 
injects needed resources for the housing, education, health and social protection of displaced 
population.  
Table 1.9. Disaster Management Fund 
 
Sector Overall (NWFP + FATA) 
PKR (M) US$ (M) 
Social Sectors 
Livelihood & Social Protection 15,360 192 
Housing 6,580 82 
Education 5,436 68 
Health 1,527 19 
Physical Infrastructure 
Transport 19,651 246 
Water & Sanitation 313 4 
Energy 1,866 23 
Productive Sectors 
Industry, Tourism, Private assets 917 12 
Agriculture, Livestock & Irrigation 22,681 284 
Cross Cutting Themes 
Environment 4,800 60 
Governance 7,787 97 
Grand Total 86,918 1,087 
             Source: Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA), 2009 
 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
 
 
2.1. Terrorism and War on Terror (WOT): 
 
The advent of 21st century has witnessed a new form of international conflict which increasingly 
relates to acts of terrorism. It was on September 11, 2001 that the basis of this new conflict was 
formed when a group of young men of Arabian origin belonging to AL Qaeda, perpetuated a 
spectacular act of terrorism against the US capitalist and defense symbols by hitting hijacked 
airplanes into the twin towers in New York City and the Pentagon. As an after math, a war was 
announced and waged against terrorists by the US which saw US going into Afghanistan and 
Iraq with much force and fury to dismantle regimes that supported these terrorists and their 
networks. The causes of 9/11 terrorist acts were seen to be derived from Islamic extremism, 
and thus a general backlash against Islamic fundamentalism was initiated in Western societies. 
Despite this peculiar brand of terrorism later emerging more frequently in the conflict areas of 
Afghanistan and Iraq forming the very basis for a prolonged War on Terror (WOT), terrorism 
still has very general connotations and it is a phenomenon which is not restricted to Islamic 
fundamentalism.  
 
Rather terrorism is an extreme form of a war tactic which leads to violent outcomes mostly 
within civilian populations which makes it more deadly and against the norms of traditional 
forms of conflicts. Though all armed conflicts lead to casualties, civilian and defense, acts of 
terrorism are mostly perpetuated against civil populations. The terrorists seek maximum 
casualties through explosive devices. More lethal the explosive device is, more successful their 
action is. Terrorists choose targets which are often high in population density to create greater 
impacts on their victims.  
 
Since 1983, the U.S. Department of State has employed the following definition of terrorism 
which is largely accepted by many governments and international organizations:‘The term 
“terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non 
combatant targets by substantial groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an 
audience. The term “international terrorism” means terrorism involving citizens or the territory 
of more than one country.’ 
 
The definitions of terrorism put more emphasis on the intentions of terrorists to cause fear and 
terror among a target audience rather than the harm caused to the immediate victims. Nations 
states can also be seen as perpetrators of terrorism. Poverty and underdevelopment, which is 
generally perceived to be promoters of terrorism, actually has little to do with terrorism. In case 
of suicide bombers, the evidence suggests that they are likely to come from economically 
advantaged families and have a relatively high level of education as to come from the ranks of 
economically disadvantaged and uneducated (Krueger and Maleckova, 2003).  
 
 
 
Generally terrorists have three main tactical goals: 
 
1) To gain Publicity for their cause and to have more media attention, terrorists prefer 
cities. 
2) Terrorists seek to destabilize the political system in a country so that state legitimacy 
and control is compromised and anarchy is promoted which in turn would improve their 
chances of success. 
3) Terrorists are particularly against the economy of the country. A poorly performing 
economy would entail higher material costs on the population which increase the 
chances that the population would yield to their demands.  
 
There is rich literature available which discuss the economic costs of terrorism. The costs 
comprise of slowdown in tourist activities, FDI flows, trade flows and loss of real and human 
capital.  
Table 2.1 Costs of Terrorist Attacks 
 
Author Dependent 
Variable 
Country Time Length Methodology Cost 
Enders and 
Sandler (1991) 
Tourism Spain 1970-1988 VAR 14,000 less 
tourists 
 
Enders et al 
(1992) 
 
Tourism 
 
Austria 
Italy 
Greece 
 
1974-1988 
 
ARIMA 
 
$4.538 billion 
$1.159 billion 
$0.77 billion 
 
Fleisher and 
Buccola (2002) 
 
Tourism 
 
Israel 
 
1992-1998 
 
Supply and 
demand model 
 
$ 50 million 
 
Sloboda (2003) 
 
Tourism 
 
US 
 
1998-2001 
 
ARMAX 
 
$ 57 billion 
 
Ito and Lee 
(2004) 
 
Tourism 
 
US 
 
Spetember 11 
 
Reduced demand 
model for air line 
industry 
 
30 % of revenue 
passenger miles 
 
Drakos and 
Kutan (2003) 
 
Tourism 
 
Austria 
Italy 
Greece 
 
1991-2000 
 
SURE 
 
$ 4.467 billion 
Enders and 
Sandler (1996) 
FDI Spain 
Greece 
1975-1991 
1976-1991 
VAR $ 500 million 
$ 400 million 
 
Nitsch and 
Schumacher 
(2004) 
 
Bilateral 
Trade 
 
More than 200 
countries 
 
1968-1979 
 
Extended Gravity 
Model 
 
4 % of bilateral 
trade flows 
 
Becker and 
Murphey (2001) 
 
Real and 
Human 
Capital 
 
US 
 
September 11 
 
- 
 
$ 25-60 billion 
 
George W. Bush introduced the doctrine after 9/11 terrorist acts that ‘either you are with us or 
against us’ which forms the basis of War on Terror. Any entity which supports terrorism directly 
or indirectly is deemed as part of the terrorism problem. Taliban, who formed the government 
in Afghanistan in 2001, were found to be supporters of Al Qaeda and thus a direct war was 
waged against them. Taliban had influence in Pakistan’s tribal areas and thus to side with US 
meant that Pakistan not only break its ties with the Taliban but wage a war against elements 
within its borders who are sympathetic with Taliban and Al Qaeda. Since 2001, Pakistan did act 
against Taliban and their sympathizers which resulted in a low intensity conflict in tribal areas 
of North Western Province of Pakistan. Al Qaeda became active in Pakistan by perpetuating 
terrorist acts against state and the people of Pakistan. All major cities of Pakistan have 
witnessed several deadly terrorist acts. Since 2007, Pakistani army has become more proactive 
in its actions against Al Qaeda and Taliban networks in tribal belts. The outcome has been an 
increased terrorist activity in the country.  
 
The objectives of Al Qaeda in Pakistan are to de stablise the country by increasing economic 
and political costs. They have been successful in many counts. For example, just before 2007 
elections, the murder of Benazir Bhutto, ex prime minister of Pakistan, through a suicide attack 
has been attributed to Pakistani faction of Taliban.  
 
It is important to note here is that literature finds that deterrence against terrorism is best 
achieved if the coping strategy is based on benevolence rather than threat (Frey and 
Luechinger, 2003). After 9/11 in the US WOT, which is now a global WOT with Pakistan as a key 
stakeholder, the emphasis has been on using police and military forces against the terrorists 
which according to benevolence theory would deepen the conflict rather than solving it.  
 
 
2.2. Costs of 9/11 to USA: 
 
Were US justified to wage a global WOT? The economic costs of 9/11 may explain the US 
reaction which was based on deterrence through threat.  
 
Various studies have estimated the economic effects of 9/11 on US economy. The direct costs 
involve destruction of infrastructure and human capital which goes as high as 60 billion dollars 
according to one estimate (Becker and Murphey, 2001). Another study estimates the human 
capital loss to be 40 billion dollars and property loss to be between 10 and 13 billion dollars 
(Navarro and Spencer, 2001).  
 
 The destruction of twin towers alone lead to the loss 13 million square feet of real estate, and 
30% of superior office space in down town New York.  It is further estimated that budget deficit 
of the city worsened after the attacks. The city was running a balance budget regime before but 
it witnessed a short fall in revenue by 7 % post 9/11(Bram et al, 2002) The main damage was 
done to the public facilities. Initial reports indicate that New York’s public facilities experienced 
approximately $ 1.4 billion in damage from the attack. 
 
‘The importance of these facilities to New York City can be illustrated by way of a rough 
calculation of the value of the World Trade Center’s PATH station. With the destruction of the 
facility on September 11, some 20,000 New Jersey – Lower Manhattan commuters were forced 
to find alternate means of transportation to work. For some this required a shift to more 
expensive ferries crossing the Hudson River from Hoboken, New Jersey. But for the substantial 
number who had commuted from the PATH station in Newark, New Jersey, the quickest option 
was to take a commuter rail to Pennsylvania Station in New York City and then a city subway to 
Lower Manhattan. New Jersey Transit, the state’s commuter line, estimates that daily ridership 
to Pennsylvania Station increased by 15,000 passengers following September 11, despite the 
immediate loss of jobs experienced. For these riders, a twenty two minute ride from Newark to 
Lower Manhattan was replaced by a twenty minute train ride to midtown plus a twenty to 
thirty minute subway ride downtown, with a similar lengthening of the homeward commute. 
The additional time cost is thus approximately one hour per commuter per day. If we assume 
that 15,000 workers who value their commuting time at $ 25 per hour (half their hourly wage) 
are spending an additional hour per day commuting, we obtain the daily cost of $ 375,000, 
implying that the first year loss of the World Trade Center PATH station cost nearly $ 100 
million in lost time.’ (Bram et al, 2002:91) 
 
Post 9/11 also witnessed a stringent security measures in the US which particularly hit the air 
line industry hard. Ito and Lee (2004) estimate that revenue passenger miles were dropped by 
30% initially and in the long run a 7.4% reduction took place.  
 
2.3. War on Terror: Identifying the nature of Conflict and related Costs: 
 
Estimating the full costs of conflicts is a very difficult, if not impossible task. The human and 
social costs of death, disability, dispossession and the psychological trauma associated with 
violence and terror are not really quantifiable. On the other hand, atleast in principle, the 
“purely economic costs” are amenable to quantitative measurement. Nisha et al (2001) 
 
Two types of conflict are identified in the literature: (a) Civil war (b) International war. Civil war 
is waged inside a country whereas international war is waged between two or more rival 
parties with cross border origins. As discussed above War on terror (WOT)  was originated in 
Afghanistan when in 2001, US lead coalition forces waged war against the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan on the pretext of later’s involvement in international terrorism which included 
9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. However, as the time went by, the international conflict 
reached Pakistan where Pakistani faction of Taliban was involved in armed conflict with the 
security forces in the country. In this respect, WOT has both domestic and international 
dynamics. In this paper we are more interested in relationship of WOT with Pakistan and thus 
deal it as a civil conflict. More so because the break down of social order and absence of clear 
front line in case of WOT in Pakistan makes it more common to civil war than to international 
conflict.  There are studies which corelate terrorism to civil wars (see Krueger and Maleckova, 
2003) 
 
 
Collier (1999) and Nisha et al (2001) presents some costs of civil conflict: 
 
(a) Part of the country’s labour force is reduced  due to death, disability or emigration. 
 
(b) In addition to psychological stresses and trauma, education and other forms of 
productive human capital acquisition (such as learning by doing) are disrupted and 
resultantly average skill level of the work force declines. 
 
(c) Roads become unsafe. 
 
(d) Civil liberties are suppressed which tend to reduce the efficiency of public expenditure. 
(e) Diversion of public expenditure from output-enhancing activities. i.e: As the army and 
its powers are expanded, the police force and the rule of law diminish. 
 
(f) Enforcement costs of contracts rise and security of property rights is reduced 
 
(g) There will be dissaving in the economy which leads to the destruction of capital stock. 
 
(h) In response to the deterioration in the economic environment, private agents will 
engage in portfolio substitution shifting their assets out of the economy. These assets 
include human as well as physical and financial capital. All types of domestic capital can 
gradually be transformed into financial capital by reducing investments. Households can 
reduce expenditures on education and training and send more educated household 
members abroad. 
 
(i) Trade reforms may be abandoned because they may alienate a particular producer 
group whose political support is considered vital to the war effort. 
 
 
In case the conflict is resolved there are still negative effects to the economy. Even if peace 
reduces costs of economic activity, suppression of civil liberties due to more involvement of 
security apparatus in national affairs may still prevail. There could only be partial 
restoration of productive public expenditures because military expenditures decline 
gradually.  
 
Above factors are very relevant for a country’s GDP growth potential because civil wars 
reduce growth mainly by depleting the domestic capital stock. Knight et al (1996) finds that 
physical and human capital, together with military spending and trade policy are most 
relevant in explaining negative growth effect of civil conflict. Military expenditure is the 
prominent variable in their conflict equations while other effects are indirectly linked with 
conflict. For example reduced trade or loss of physical and human capital is an outcome 
which arises from the violence rather than their direct effects on civil conflict. For growth 
however, civil war is more relevant if it effects the composition of public expenditure 
through for example military spending. However, it should also be noted here that in 
conflict literature military spending is not always a cost because increases in military 
spending is not always associated with outbreaks of war (Nisha et al, 2001).   
 
In finding over all growth impact of conflict, a decent econometric model may not be 
constructed due to high correlation of policy variables which are relevant for growth.  
Variable choice needs to be made which can prevent estimation problems arising from such 
correlations. In this respect most of the studies which capture effects of civil war on growth 
adopt simpler methodological choices by restricting the number of variables which enter in 
their growth equations.  (see for example Collier 1999; Easterly and Levine, 1997; and Sachs 
and Warner, 1995)  
 
Here in this paper we are interested in gauging the effects of WOT on Pakistan’s exporting 
industry and not growth per say. Thus in line of Collier et al (1998), we adopt simpler 
empirical methodologies whereby conflict is measured through violence while variables 
which are relevant for trade would be included. A detailed discussion on the variables is 
presented in the next section.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3. Pakistan’s Export Performance and War on Terror 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
It has been nearly a decade now that Pakistan had been participating in the War on Terror 
(WoT) as a front line ally. Pakistan’s participation in the international campaign has caused 
uncertainty in the country, as it has been facing major challenges, like domestic, political and 
economic instability, high trade cost and increased law and order concerns amongst other 
reasons. In Pakistan, there are no two opinions about the fact that its economy has been 
weakened by the war. The extent of the costs/damages however remains a major 
question/controversy with serious policy implications. Where one can put a figure on them the 
cost is immense.3 
 
Several reports prepared by National and International organizations have made an attempt to 
quantify the cost of war against terrorism in Pakistan, but there is still requirement of an in-
depth analysis of impact, challenges and future constraints that this war holds to quantify the 
true cost of this war on Pakistan international trade. The conflict in recent years has deepened 
the structural problems within different sectors of Pakistan’s economy. Likewise, there is a 
need to revisit the reasons for Pakistan’s current economic downturn and asses the role played 
by the ongoing WoT. The following sections highlight the different channels through which WoT 
has impacted Pakistan’s economy with special reference to export performance. 
 
 
3.2. Trends in Macroeconomic Indicators 
 
As Pakistan faced increased involvement in armed conflict against terrorists, Pakistan’s larger 
economic landscape presented a bleak picture. GDP growth rate Post 2007 is averaged at 
merely 3%. Fiscal deficit has enlarged while development budgets are squeezed (see table 1). 
The economic turmoil has many dimensions. Last three years have witnessed many exogenous 
shocks to local economies. Financial meltdown, rising oil prices and commodity price hike had 
already weakened states all over the globe. Sluggish economic activity all round the world and 
specifically in Pakistan have reduced fiscal space as current account deficits ballooned while 
investments dried up. Nevertheless Pakistan’s neighbors like China and India have largely 
continued with their progress with sustained growth rates even under global recession.  
Pakistan may have also followed the footsteps of China and India had it not been for adverse 
security situation within the country. 
 
 
 
                                                           
3
 See The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of Iraq Conflict by Joseph Stiglitz 
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 The slowdown in Pakistan’s GDP growth rate started in 2006 but it was still above 6% mark but 
by 2008 the rate plummeted to less than 4% and slumped to 2% by end of 2009(see Figure 1). 
Pakistan’s exporting sector also slowed down by 2007 with negative growth rates in 2009 
suggesting an overall decline in Pakistan’s exports.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Trends in GDP and Export Growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 
 
 
With a slowdown in the economy fiscal deficits have increased and settled at 6 % of the GDP  as 
an average of last three years of WoT intensification period when compared to 2001-06 
average of 3.8 %. A sharper fall has been observed in foreign direct investments (FDI) which 
witnessed a negative growth by end of 2009(see Figure 2). 
 
 
 
Table 3.1 Trends in Macro Economic Indicators 
 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
Inflation (average) 7.8 12.0 20.8 
GDP growth 6.8 4.1 2.0 
Large-scale manufacturing growth 8.6 4.8 -8.2 
Tax revenue (% of GDP) 10.2 10.6 9.2 
Fiscal deficit (% of GDP) 4.3 7.6 5.2 
External account deficit (% of GDP) 5.1 8.5 5.3 
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Figure 3.2 Fluctuations in Fiscal & Trade Deficits and FDI Growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan  
 
3.3.    Trends in Social Indicators: 
 
With a falling fiscal space, development expenditures also witnessed decreasing trends with a 
negative growth rate in 2009 (see Figure 3). Large displacements of civilians in NWFP and 
FATA, higher budgetary constraints, low levels of investment in development sector have 
negative implication for poverty trends. Programs like Benazir support fund may become 
ineffective in the longer run as more people find themselves below poverty line while the 
state finds itself under resource crunch amid decline in larger economic activity. Due to 
healthy growth trends till 2007, Pakistan has performed well on poverty front with poverty 
falling to 17 % in 2007. However these trends have to be revised upwards in current scenario.  
First, with low growth rate, number of people living below poverty line is expected to rise in 
the coming years along with the unemployment rate (see figure 3).  
 
Figure 3.3 Social Indicator Trends 
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3.4. Diversion of Resources and Effect on Developmental Plans 
National Economic Council approved Rs 334 billion for Public Sector Development Program 
(PSDP) for fiscal year 2008-09. However, only Rs 211 billion were made available which is only 
63% of the actual amount provided. For 2009-10 fiscal year a hefty amount of Rs 421 billion was 
approved but only 10% funds have been released during the first 3 months (July – Oct) showing 
a steep fall in state's capacity to promote pro poor economic activity in the country. The Public 
Sector Development Program may shrink to Rs 275 billion against the total allocations of Rs 421 
billion as per the federal government share. Budget deficit is expected to rise to 5.3 % of GDP as 
against the targeted 4.9%. The rationalization of PSDP has resulted due to the unbudgeted 
burden of  Rs 310 billion, out of which Rs 170 billion is WOT related additional security 
expenditure.  
The cut in PSDP will have serious implications in terms of critical development projects 
remaining underfunded. The allocation of Rs 275 billion would be a thin spread among the 
development projects resulting in delays leading to costs over run; the Bhasha dam project is a 
clear example for which per year economic loss is estimated to be around Rs 100 billion. The 
total PSDP for the 2009-10 was of Rs 621 billion; the share of the federal government was put 
at Rs 421 billion while remaining Rs 200 billion were to be met by the provinces. The operation 
in Swat, Malakand and Waziristan as well as subsidy on electricity could result in a further cut in 
PSDP making the actual allocation even lower then Rs 275 billion.  
The rising budget deficit is causing a reduction in developmental spending as the defense 
budget cannot be cut due to ongoing operations Swat, Malakand and Waziristan. As the activity 
related to war on terror and security concerns increase further diversion of resources is 
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expected in the latter half of the current fiscal year. The expanding current expenditure with 
the intensification of war on terror would lead to further cut in developmental spending. This 
would have severe repercussions on the infrastructure requirements of the overall economy 
and specially the production sector. The transport sector already stretched due to being utilized 
by NATO and ISAF would experience further deterioration because of lack of investment in 
enhancing the transport capacity and road infrastructure. The energy and power projects 
experiencing delays and remaining underfunded would add more pressure on the business 
community in terms of higher input costs. 
3.5. The Hard-Hit Exporting Sectors 
 
In the fiscal year 2007-08, the manufacturing sector of Pakistan experienced the weakest 
growth in a decade. Large-scale manufacturing which accounts for 69.5% of overall 
manufacturing evidenced a growth of only 4.8% in 2007-08 and -8.2% in 2008-09 against 
growth of 8.6% in 2006-07. Clearly, the manufacturing sector of Pakistan has been hurt badly 
since the intensification of the war. In 2004-05, large-scale manufacturing reached the highest 
growth rate of 19.9%. 
 
Export performance of important sectors of Pakistan has been deteriorating rapidly since war 
intensification. The two most important sectors of Pakistan, i.e. leather and textiles, have 
suffered immensely. Table 2 presents a picture a clear picture declining exports in the leather 
sector. 
 
Agha Saiddain Chairman (2008-09), Tanning Industry, North Region, Pakistan Tanning 
Association (PTA) in an interview stated that:  
 
“There has been a 27% decline in export of leather products during July – November 2009, while 
India’s exports increased by 30% over the same period. Power outages, government negligence 
of the sector, and most significantly disruption in the supply chain, raw materials for the 
industry coming from Baluchistan, due to WoT have resulted in huge losses for this sector. 
Leather sector of Pakistan is the hardest hit since the supply chains of raw materials from 
Afghanistan, NWFP and Baluchistan have been disrupted, leading to a loss of competitiveness in 
the international market for leather. Imported raw materials are now subject to higher 
insurance rates for Pakistan.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3.2   Month-wise Export Figures of Leather, Leather Apparel & Clothing, Leather Gloves, Leather 
Footwear and other Leather Manufactures (2007 and 2008) 
 
Month Export Value 
 ($ millions) 
Month Export Value 
 ($ millions) 
July 07 96.805 July 08 107.804 
August 07 88.393 August 08 90.654 
September 07 90.403 September 08 103.540 
October 07 83.323 October 08 70.203 
November 07 127.252 November 08 93.901 
December 07 114.655 December 08 69.239 
January 08 77.750 January 09 78.082 
February 08 100.628 February 09 65.720 
March 08 125.018 March 09 65.261 
April 08 96.967 April 09 63.927 
May 08 109.200 May 09 72.978 
June 08 109.727 June 09 77.837 
TOTAL 1220.121 TOTAL 959.146 
                Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics 
 
Small and Medium Enterprise(SME) sector is critical to inclusive economic growth and 
employment. Large corporations can engage with SMEs and localize the creation of value, and 
in this way, large corporations build the capacity of SMEs leading to economic development 
(WBCSD). 
 
Pakistan’s SME businesses have been adversely affected by the WoT. The negative 
consequences to the trading activities of SMEs are mainly attributed to the WoT and to a lesser 
extent to the global financial and energy crises. The negative consequences of global financial 
crisis are not as great for Pakistan as compared to other countries because the financial sector 
of Pakistan is inadequately linked with global markets (Ali 2009). Also, according to the IMF 
(2009a), Pakistan has not been adversely affected by the global financial crisis due to non-
integration of the domestic financial sector with the global financial sector. The government 
has not been able to deal with the energy crisis because its attention and resources have been 
diverted towards the WoT. 
 
Fayyaz Riaz Head, Industrial Support Program SMEDA highlighted that 
 
“New businesses that are small have been harmed as they are not considered credible. They 
cannot get customers as easily as the established ones. Both new and old firms have lost many 
business opportunities as it is harder to make new customers. New businesses have gone to 
competitors. No government assistance to any size of firm. Post quota era subsidy for R&D 
support, which encompassed that 6% of export value subsidy was given to all exporters is no 
longer there. It was eliminated in June 2007 or 2008. Sales tax refund on exports, the policy has 
changed for that as well. It was 100% sales tax refund.” 
 
3.6. Performance in Major Export markets 
 
The result of the WoT is the alarming deterioration in the image/perception of Pakistan, and 
poor image of the goods it exports to the extent that clients have requested to have no label on 
the products.” Major trading partners of Pakistan have been given travel advice to avoid 
travelling to Pakistan. Pakistani exporters also face the problem of visa and hence find it 
difficult to make deals and promote & market their products. All these factors have contributed 
to the decline/stagnant export share of Pakistan in its major trading partner markets (see Table 
3). 
 
Table 3.3 Major Export Markets for Pakistan 
Country  2005-06 
(%)  
2006-07 
(%)  
2007-08 
(%)  
2008-09 
(%)  
USA  25.5  24.6  19.5  18.8  
Germany  4.2  4.1  4.3  4.1  
Japan  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.7  
UK  5.4  5.6  5.4  4.8  
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2009 
 
3.7. Rising Costs in the Export Cycle 
 
The Finance ministry estimated a loss $ 1.4 billion to exports which clearly shows that Pakistan’s 
exports have suffered and are still suffering losses due to war on terror. It is feared that these 
losses might be much higher once a detailed assessment of the stages involved in the entire 
export cycle is carried out. The following sections seek to identify how the efficiency of the 
supply chain has been affected leading to higher logistics cost and rising trade cost due to the 
negative soft image abroad. High logistics cost to exporters are eventually transformed to 
higher export prices, thus reducing the competitiveness level of export commodities. It is most 
essential that the total quality of the product and supply chain is bound together to avoid 
shortcomings at one end resulting in un-competitiveness at the client end. 
 
 
3.7.1. Logistics Costs 
 
In the ever increasing race of achieving high level of competitiveness among countries, the 
quality of logistics can have a major impact on a firm’s decisions about which country to locate 
in, which suppliers to buy from, and which consumer markets to enter. High logistics costs and 
more particularly low levels of service are a barrier to trade and foreign direct investment and 
thus to economic growth. Countries with higher overall logistics costs are more likely to face 
deteriorating overall as well as sectoral competitiveness. 
 
Pakistan’s performance in key logistics indicators has deteriorated significantly from 2006 
onwards which also marks the intensification of War on Terror period. A comparison of 
Pakistan’s Logistics Performance Index (LPI) with its major competitors reveals the w
logistics in the export supply chain from 2006 to 2010(see Figure 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Cross-Country Comparison of Logistics Performance Index (LPI)
Source: World Trade Indicators (2007 & 2010)
 
Late deliveries and transport costs hampers the
total quality of exports is a combination of quality in products and quality in supply. Here 
we analyze the quality of supply in Pakistan  through different logistics efficiency measures 
in the year 2006 which is taken as the Pre war on terror period visa viz its competitors and 
in the year 2010 which is taken as the Post war period. 
indicators propose a comprehensive approach to supply chain performance. The table 
shows a major decline in Pakistan’s performance in all indices with a major fall in the 
efficiency of customs and tracking& tracing vis
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Table 3.4 Cross country Comparison of Logistics Indices 
 
Country  Customs  Infrastructure  Logistics 
Competence  
Tracking 
/ Tracing  
Timeliness  
India 
(2006)  
2.69  2.9  3.27  3.03  3.47  
(47)  (42)  (31)  (42)  (47)  
 
 India 
(2010)  
 
2.7  
 
2.91  
 
3.13  
 
3.16  
 
3.14  
(52)  (47)  (46)  (40)  (52)  
 
Pak. 
(2006)  
 
2.41  
 
2.37  
 
2.71  
 
2.57  
 
2.93  
(69)  (71)  (63)  (76)  (88)  
 
 Pak. 
(2010)  
 
2.05  
 
2.08  
 
2.91  
 
2.28  
 
2.64  
(134)  (120)  (66)  (120)  (93)  
 
Sri. 
(2006)  
 
2.25  
 
2.13  
 
2.45  
 
2.58  
 
2.69  
(89)  (105)  (84)  (75)  (113)  
  
Sri. 
(2010)  
 
1.96  
 
1.88  
 
2.48  
 
2.09  
 
2.23  
(143)  (138)  (117)  (142)  (142)  
 
Bang. 
(2006)  
 
2  
 
2.29  
 
2.33  
 
2.46  
 
3.33  
(126)  (82)  (101)  (87)  (54)  
  
Bang. 
(2010)  
 
2.33  
 
2.49  
 
2.99  
 
2.44  
 
2.64  
(90)  (72)  (61)  (96)  (92)  
Source: World Trade Indicators (2007 & 2010) 
 
 
According to the Doing Business surveys, there has been a reduction in the number of 
documents required for exporting in India and Bangladesh where as Pakistan has remained 
stagnant during the period 2006-2008 (see Table 3.5).  The Doing Business 2008 report showed 
that it is now less costly to export a container consignment from Pakistan than from India, Sri 
Lanka and Bangladesh. Pakistan’s days to export are considerably more as compared to its 
competitors and have remained stagnant (44 days) between the period 2006-2008 (see table 
1). This shows that Pakistan’s performance in these logistics indexes has remained either 
stagnant or deteriorated after 2006 which clearly illustrates that exports have potentially been 
effected through increase logistics cost.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.5 Cross Country Comparison of Cost of Doing Business Indicators 
 
Country Days 
for 
export 
Days 
for 
export 
No. of 
documents 
for export 
No. of 
documents 
for export 
UNCTAD 
Liner 
shipping 
connectivity 
index (0 to 
100, best) 
UNCTAD  
Liner 
shipping 
connectivity 
index (0 to 
100, best) 
Cost to 
export 
(US$ per 
container) 
Cost to 
export 
(US$ per 
container) 
2006 2008 2006 2008 2006 2008 2006 2008 
 Bangladesh 35 28 7 6 5.29 6.4 902 970 
 India 23 23 10 8 42.9 42.18 864 945 
 Pakistan 44 44 9 9 21.82 24.61 515 611 
 Sri Lanka 6 6 7 8 37.31 46.08 797 865 
Source: World Trade Indicators year 
 
Moreover the logistics cost and performance may have changed with intensification of WOT 
from 2007 onwards. From a policy perspective, one needs to assess the role of worsening 
logistic performance (if any) on declining exports in the last two years. Discussed below are 
some of the key areas in the logistics supply chain which have been effected most due to the 
WoT and its intensification.  
 
3.7.2. Transportation Costs Increased & Capacity Severely Stretched 
 
The long waiting and traveling times, high costs and low reliability are hindering the country’s 
economic growth. These factors reduce the competitiveness of the country’s exports and 
constrain Pakistan’s ability to integrate into global supply chains, which require just-in-time 
delivery.  The war on terror is impacting the transportation sector of Pakistan by increasing the: 
 
1. Higher charges due to higher risks 
2. Risks of damage/disruption involved in transporting 
3. Non-availability of transport due to Diversion to Afghan Transit Trade (ATT), 
NATO, ISAF 
4. Financial Impact of NATO/ISAF freight on Transit Routes  
5. Rush due to strikes 
6. One day closure of business activity causes rush the next day further raising the 
cost 
 
After carrying out stakeholder consultations it was found that transportation costs have gone 
up significantly and they fluctuate on daily bases depending on the current security situation in 
the country. The Exporters and freight forwarders interviewed raised similar concerns on the 
fact that transporters charge more due to risk associated with traveling, which rises with every 
terrorist activity. The average truck transport rates between Lahore and Karachi as presented in 
the World Bank logistics study compared to the current prevailing rates are as follows: 
 
 
Table 3.6 Fluctuating Transport rates 
 
 
 
The transport rates have also increased after the Afghan transit as the limited transport 
capacity of Pakistan has been diverted to carrying US cargo, resulting in limited transport 
available for exporters. This leads to a reduction in the bargaining ability of the exporter and 
sometimes trucks are not available, which causes delays in shipment. This problem is more 
frequently faced by exporters in Up country. If business closes due to strike for one day the 
rates go up the next working day due to backlog as well 
 
3.7.2.1. Freight charges 
 
The global recession has led to a fall in international freight charges world wide but the case for 
Pakistan has been entirely opposite because of security issues intensifying in the past 2 to 3 
years. All the exporters interviewed have put forth there concern over high freight charges. The 
freight forwarders5 justify the high charges due to higher risks of delays arising from strikes 
which increase the detention charges on the transport hired. Thus they have increased their 
over heads.  
 
In Pakistan Freight forwarders charge higher overhead due to risk and possibility of delays because of 
random terrorists attacks, which confounds the already poor shipping connectivity of Pakistan. 
 
3.7.2.2. Insurance Costs 
 
The risks arising from the security situation due to war on terror has affected the insurance 
cost. According to freight forwarders the inland transit insurance charges fluctuate on daily 
basis and even increase by 400% due to the higher risk resulting from a bomb blast or any other 
                                                           
4
 These estimates are taken on average from the information provided by freight forwarders. 
5 Freight forwarders and express carriers are in a privileged position to assess how countries perform on logistics. They manage 
operations from factory and warehouse to port, from port to overland transit, and through one or more borders to destination, with 
each link testing a country’s logistics infrastructure performance 
 
World Bank Logistics study 
(2006) 
 
Rs 14,000 per 20’ container 
 
 
Current prevailing rates4 
 
Rs 35,000-45000 per 20’ container 
On the day of strike or terrorist activity the rates shoot up to 
Rs 60,000 
terrorist activity. Sometimes the insurance companies even refuse or are not willing to cover up 
the entire insurance. This shows that insurance cost are highly sensitive to the current security 
risk. Shipping charges have also increased due to the fact that Pakistan’s ports have remained in 
the red zone which increased the insurance cost of vessels. 
 
Shipping companies in order to cover up the high insurance cost have introduced the War Risk 
Surcharge which on average is $50 per container and increases as the security concerns 
heightened within the country. 
 
3.7.2.3. Delays in Shipment 
 
Pakistan’s major export commodity is textile which is seasonal in nature. According to a few 
textile exporters interviewed 
 
“Buyers are not placing their orders in the prevailing uncertain environment. They doubt the 
timely supply of goods from Pakistan. As a result our exports are affected badly, where as 
exports serve as one of the major source for earning foreign exchange. Unfortunately the 
growth of this important sector of the economy is in a continuous jeopardy.” 
 
The timely export of goods doesn’t remain possible many a times because of war on terror and 
the prevailing social unrest/hazards. The different channels through which war on terror is 
causing delays in shipments, identified from stakeholders’ experiences are given as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• High security risk for inland transportation 
• One day close-down of port costs Rs 4 billion [FBR estimates] 
• Frequent port (and entry points) close-downs 
▫ Off days, followed by rush (further delays) 
▫ Vessels missed + delay/ detention charges on export containers starting from $5 
per day demurrage and import container $7 per day as well as $40 per day 
detention charges. 
 
• Shipment shut-outs due to stricter scrutiny at port/terminals 
▫ Karachi International Container terminal alone reported 5,842  
  Shut-out Teus in 2009 
▫ Special checking and scanning and increased cost of compliance for US bound 
cargo 
 
• Port Congestion faced by both exporters and importers 
 
▫ Rush experienced when business activity is resumed after a strike or terrorists 
attack 
▫ Afghan bound cargo dwell time is 16 days (with 14 days free time resulting in 
excessive usage of port as a warehouse) compared to 4 days for exports and 10 
days for imports.  
 The rising issue of delays in shipment can worsen in the coming years. The delays in shipment is 
closely associated with war on terror, therefore a favorable trade environment is most vital for 
reducing these bottlenecks.  
 
3.7.3. Marketing cost 
 
Negative travel advisories against Pakistan by several foreign governments have discouraged 
foreign buyers from visiting Pakistan. The following costs have been identified that are having a 
detrimental effect on the costs of international marketing: 
 
3.7.3.1. Rising cost of Insurance for travelling to Pakistan 
Travel advisories have negatively impacted Pakistan’s exports in many ways. Negative travel 
advisories discourage travelling to Pakistan, which has heightened the risk factor. This has 
caused the higher business travel insurance premiums. However, some insurance policies do 
not even cover travel to vulnerable countries like Pakistan, Iraq and Afghanistan.  
 
“A review of travel insurance premiums charged by major international insurance groups1 for 
Pakistan over the past ten years reveals that Pakistan has been categorized as a “high risk” zone 
and, depending on the type of insurance policy, the rates have been increased by approximately 
three times” 
 
According to the National Insurance Company, exorbitant premium rates under the provision of 
‘Terrorism Cover’ are being charged, which are 50% - 200% higher than the normal travel 
insurance cover rates6. The high insurance cost coupled with the risk of loss of life or 
kidnapping results in foreign buyers refraining from travelling to Pakistan.  
 
3.7.3.2. Inability to Attract Foreign Buyers / Technical Experts 
 
In addition to foreign buyers and their associates not travelling to Pakistan, the negative impact 
of travel advisories is that technical experts, especially from USA & EU, are also refraining from 
offering their services in Pakistan which has resulted in delays and production losses. 
  
Pakistan Carpet Manufacturers and Exporters Association was of the view that hand knotted 
carpets were a unique product and so buyers place orders after inspecting every piece of the 
carpet. Since buyers are now reluctant to travel to Pakistan and transporting carpet samples to 
other countries is a costly undertaking, as a result exports have almost halved.  
 
 
 
 
                                                           
6
 National Insurance Company Limited “Implementation of Trade Policy 2009-10” Doc NICL/ICBusiness/43-09 
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Figure 3.5. Travel Advisories Against
   Source: US Embassy 
 
First time the travel advisories of US issued the highest caution against travelling to Pakistan 
was in 2003 (see Figure 3.5). Soon after, the negative impact of travel advisories on exports 
began to unfold. Exporters and business representatives allayed their fears to government 
authorities on this issue. It was due to the gravity of the matter that on every subsequent 
foreign visit by the President or Prime Minister the removal of travel advisories was
vociferously articulated at the highest level
 
Figure 3.6.  Issuance of Business Visa to Japanese Businessmen
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Pakistan High Commission in Japan
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- and from traveling to the listed countries.) 
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isits.  
 
 
 There has been a declining trend in the number of visits of foreign business men to Pakistan. 
Figure 3.6 shows that the number of business visas issued to Japanese business men has 
reduced drastically since 2007 which is the post war intensification period
 
Due to security concerns, foreign buyers and exhibitors are not coming to Pakistan to attend 
trade fairs. TDAP Expo Secretariat officials in Karachi reported that the response of 
international buyers and exhibitors to participate in the upcoming event 
disappointing despite facilitation by TDAP, in terms of subsidized air tickets etc
 
 
       Source : Calculation of data from Pakistan Mission abroad
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3.7.3.3. Increased Foreign visits of Pakistani Exporters 
The negative impact of travel advisories has been strongly felt in textiles which is Pakistan’s 
largest exporting sector. Since travel advisories are keeping potential buyers away from 
Pakistan, textile exporters have to send their representatives to negotiate and deal with buyers 
abroad.   
 
The adverse security environment has led to the closure of foreign buyers’ liaison offices in 
Pakistan. In comparison Bangladesh, which is not a victim of the War on Terror, has more than 
1000 buying houses compared to a negligible few in Pakistan. Closure of liaison offices has 
added to the marketing costs of Pakistani exporters as not only do they have to travel abroad 
more frequently but exporters also have to open their own liaison offices and display centers in 
major markets like US and Germany. 
 
In an interview with S. M Khalid, GAP Buying House it was found that… 
 
“EU and USA buyers no longer feel safe coming to Pakistan. Before the WOT, importers would 
visit factories in search of reliable outsourcing partners. They would place orders and when 
satisfied, they would divert their orders from other countries towards Pakistan, but after WOT, 
they now place orders with India, Bangladesh, etc. While placing a huge order, the stakes are 
high and so it is an important consideration that the factory should be easily and frequently 
visited and inspected” 
 
“Many foreign buying houses closed down in Pakistan after the WOT, as there is no point in 
maintaining them if company executives cannot visit. This has resulted in loss of exports for 
Pakistan and a gain for other countries.” 
 
“Pakistan has been USA’s key ally in the WOT, but USA imposes a tariff rate of 19% on garments 
from Pakistan, whereas only 16% on Indian garments” 
 
3.7.3.4. Decline in Participation in International Trade Fairs 
The absence of foreign buyers has meant that exporters now have to travel more often to 
international trade fairs, which charge a hefty participation fee.  According to TDAP, the 
primary agency responsible for taking trade delegations abroad, exporters participate in 
international trade fairs through either TDAP, Chambers of Commerce or at their own expense 
which is more costly for an exporter. The war on terror has caused decline in participation in 
international trade fairs. The war on terror has resulted in fiscal imbalances and a shift in 
resources away from other sectors. The major reason for increase in participation costs has 
been the withdrawal of subsidies for participating in trade fairs as TDAP does not have enough 
funding to subsidize this activity anymore mainly due to the falling Export Development Fund 
(EDF). This is evidenced by the fact that in 1997 TDAP took delegations to over 100 trade fairs 
abroad whereas in 2009 it only took about 50 delegations9.  
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 3.7.3.5. Denial and delay in issuance of visas to Pakistani business travelers 
Issuance of visas was not a problem until a few years ago. Due to the current security situation, 
many countries have placed stringent visa requirements on Pakistani travelers and high visa 
refusal rates can be seen( see Table 3.7). This has resulted in an increase in psychological, 
monetary and time costs for Pakistani exporters. 
 
Source: Pakistan High Commissions 
 
3.7.4. Market Share Analysis 
 
In 1999 Pakistan’s share in global exports was 0.2 %. 10However in the coming years Pakistan 
failed to retain its export share which first plummeted to 0.149% in 2001 and stands as low as 
0.126 % in 2008 (table 3.8, first column). In between 2001 and 2008, the shares fluctuated but 
never reached the levels of 1990s. Beyond 2000, the fall in Pakistan’s exports share in global 
export market may be attributed to a number of reasons; the prime being fall in the 
competitiveness of its exporting industry which is further attributed to the war on terror.  In 
comparison to other South Asian countries during 2001-2008. India, however, has successfully 
improved its share from 0.7 % to 1.105 %.  
 
If everything remains constant and assuming that Pakistan retains its export share of 0.2 % 
during 2001-2008 period, table 1 provides annual losses in total exports mounting to a total of  
$ 48.69 billion. The losses are calculated by subtracting actual exports (derived from actual 
export shares) with potential exports (derived from 0.2 % share retention).  
 
By end of 2005, Pakistan lost GSP+ facility which resulted in yet steeper losses in export shares 
during 2006, 2007 and 2008. (see table 9, column 1). Bangladesh, which is a major competitor 
of Pakistan in its textiles sector, gained from this as it was able to exploit its position against 
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 World Trade Organization Statistics 
 
Table 3.7. Average Business Visa refusal rate by US authorities (2006-2009) 
Country  Average Refusal rate (%) 
China 19.75 
India 23.65 
Pakistan 39.45 
Pakistan with its total export share rising from 0.089 in 2005 to 0.097 in 2006. In later years, 
Bangladesh retained its higher shares which indicate that Pakistan continues to lose its market 
share to Bangladesh. 
 
However within South Asia, trade is not only diverted to Bangladesh alone. India has also been 
able to witness significant improvements in world exports shares while rising from 0.83 in 
2004 to 0.95 in 2005 (table 9, column 5). It accounts for annual growth in share of world 
exports of 14.23%, the largest gain in this decade for India.  Indian export markets continued 
to grow steadily during 2006, 2007 and 2008. Part of Pakistan’s export losses are attributed to 
Indian gains.  
 
If we account for Bangladesh and Indian world export share growth rates, they were much 
higher than that of Pakistan.  Pakistan share in world exports have largely witnessed negative 
growth.  Assuming that both Bangladesh and India have captured Pakistan’s export losses as 
their export gains through trade diversion, we can build up a scenario where we calculate 
Pakistan’s potential exports if they have grown with the average of India and Bangladesh’s 
export share instead of its own. In such a case Pakistan has lost $ 44.17 billion. (Table 3.9; see 
columns 11 and 12).  To sum up the analysis we suggest that Trade diversion from Pakistan to 
Bangladesh and India has taken place due to Trade related cost of war on terror face by 
Pakistan in addition to losses accrued by Pakistan due to Loss of GSP Plus initiative in 2005. 
 
      
 
Table 3.8. If Pakistan retained a 0.2% Share in World Exports 
                                                                                                                                                                      (US Billions) 
Year Pakistan Exports 
(A) 
Potential 
if Pakistan retained 
0.2% of World Share in 
Exports 
(B) 
Loss 
 
A-B 
2001 9.2 12.3 3.1 
2002 9.9 12.9 3.01 
2003 11.9 15.2 3.2 
2004 13.3 18.4 5.05 
2005 16.01 20.9 4.9 
2006 16.9 24.2 7.2 
2007 17.8 27.9 10.1 
2008 20.3 32.1 11.8 
   48.9 
  
          Source: Own Calculations using data from World Trade Organization 
Table 3.9. If Pakistan Share in World Exports grew by the same average as that of the other South Asian economies 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation using data from World Trade Organization 
Year PAK 
Share 
Share 
growth 
BANG 
Share 
Share 
growth 
IND 
Share 
Share 
growth 
Avg Share 
of South 
Asian 
Countries 
Share 
growth 
PAK 
Potential 
Share by 
South Asian 
AVG 
PAK 
Actual 
Exp 
PAK Potential 
Exp 
Loss 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
2001 0.149  0.098  0.700  0.39   9.2   
2002 0.153 2.32 0.095 -3.57 0.759 8.3 0.42 6.83 0.16 9.9 10.4 0.5 
2003 0.157 3.01 0.092 -2.70 0.777 2.47 0.43 1.89 0.16 11.9 12.38 0.48 
2004 0.145 -7.72 0.090 -2.23 0.831 6.97 0.46 5.99 0.17 13.3 15.95 2.65 
2005 0.153 5.45 0.089 -1.61 0.950 14.23 0.51 12.67 0.19 16.01 20.45 4.44 
2006 0.140 -8.66 0.097 9.93 0.999 5.16 0.54 5.56 0.20 16.9 24.93 8.03 
2007 0.128 -8.76 0.089 -8.63 1.051 5.25 0.57 4.01 0.21 17.8 29.95 12.15 
2008 0.126 -0.84 0.096 7.33 1.105 5.07 0.60 5.24 0.22 20.3 36.22 15.92 
            Total Loss 44.17 
4. QUANTIFYING LOSS IN EXPORT EARNINGS  
FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
In the context of various economies of the world, the review of literature chapter in this report 
extensively documented the conceptual framework and empirical evidence linking the impact 
of terrorists’ attacks on selected economies as well as international trade/exports,.   Some 
countries have experienced sporadic terrorist’s attacks over a number of years while others 
continue to face them on a continued, i.e., daily, weekly and monthly basis. The nature, 
intensity and time profile of episodes of terrorists’ attacks also vary by country and need a 
separate study to filter generalized trends and conclusions.    
 
Even prior to 9/11, Pakistan was not immune to sporadic terrorist attacks (whatever the 
underlying cause) similar to the experience of many other countries.   As a frontline state of war 
on terror, frequency and intensity of terrorist attacks in Pakistan increased notably after 9/11, 
but the costs to the economy and international trade remained benign and many would regard 
them lower then the benefits in terms of re-scheduling of debt, and increased foreign economic 
and military assistance. The positive spillover effects from Global expansion of trade and robust 
world GDP growth to the national economy further marginalized the costs of terrorists’ attacks 
on the national economy and international trade during the period 2001-2007.  However in 
absence of any empirical analysis it may be difficult to argue against the premises that due to 
terrorist attacks the economy failed to realize its full potential in growth and exports even in 
that booming period.  
 
A basic premise of this analysis is that any of the following three incidents since 2007 may have 
lead to structural shifts in the frequency and intensity of terrorist attacks in the country:- a) 
Flushing out of militants from Lal Masjid in the capital city of Islamabad in April/May 2007 
thereby raising the security level of travel advisories b) Death of Benazir Bhutto in December 
2007 provided a signal of political uncertainty and weak political/military resolve to fight the 
militants and c) US government’s announcement to shift gear from Iraq to Afghanistan in mid-
2008.  This period since 2007 also marks a gradual end to expansionary and supportive global 
economic environment wherein the economic and financial costs outweighed the benefits of 
partnership in war on terror.  
 
The outline of this chapter is as follows:-  The transmission framework of how the frequency 
and intensity of terrorist attacks impact the level and competitiveness (through changing unit 
costs) of exports will be discussed in the next section. Outline of a reduced form model to 
empirically estimate the impact of terrorist attacks on exports will also form part of this section. 
Section 4.3 will be an exploratory analysis (time trends, descriptive statistics) of indicators of 
reduced form model of the previous section as well providing statistical support to the 
delineation of above a priori time profile of incidents. Section IV will discuss the results of 
estimating the reduced form model using simple and sophisticated estimation techniques. The 
estimates from modeling will form the basis for quantification of losses to exports since 2007.1 
Section V will use the estimates of modeling exercise to quantify the range of losses to export 
potential since 2007.  
 
4.2. From terrorist attacks to reduced exports 
 
Terrorist attacks occurring on any single day/night are headline material nationally and 
internationally in mostly all types of news media ranging from newspapers to internet.  Thus in 
a globally wired world, the terrorist attacks are a symbol and signal of national insecurity 
increasing the risks to lives and property of the residents as well travelers.  Many advanced 
countries not only issue travel advisories but also change the level of previously issued travel 
advisories based on frequency and intensity of attacks.   
 
The personal travel insurance as well freight insurance are raised and thereby impact on the 
cost of doing business as well outward and inward bound trade.  Trade facilitation measures 
such as national exhibitions and individual as well firm level meetings are re-scheduled to 
another time or place or even postponed indefinitely. Visits of technical experts are 
discouraged.  Frequent and expected occurrence of attacks also change the trading strategy of 
importers and exporters. Foreign firms may shift from smaller to larger firms or altogether stop 
importing specialty products. The above fallouts from terrorist attacks ultimately impact 
directly on the level of traded goods and indirectly on the unit cost of imports and exports. For 
exports they erode the competitive edge in the world markets. 
 
In case of Pakistan for the period under consideration, external factors and internal macro 
instability further affected the growth of exports. The contagion of financial crisis in developed 
nations transmitted to Pakistan in the form of reduced exports of merchandise and foreign 
direct investment. Energy shortages and infrastructural bottlenecks within the country also 
impacted the domestic manufacturing capacity and thereby meet export orders in a timely and 
cost efficient manner, while a 25 percent depreciation of the Pakistani rupee against the US $ in 
a matter of 18 months helped to adjust real effective exchange rate in line with galloping 
inflation and may have stabilized exports. 
 
The entire analysis of the following sections revolve around analyzing and modeling the above 
stated factors as determinants of monthly exports for the 36 month period from July 2006-June 
2009.   Monthly data from July 2006 onwards related to number of terrorist incidents, including 
the number of persons injured and killed provided by the Ministry of Interior is the basis for this 
analysis.  The Pakistan Customs provided the monthly data on exports, while monthly quantum 
index of manufacturing and average monthly Pak Re/US $ is collected, processed and 
disseminated by the Federal Bureau of Statistics.  Quarterly data of GDP of 30 OECD countries 
was obtained from OECD website. 
 
 
 
 
The basic and simple specification of the reduced form model is formulated as:- 
 
Exports = f (Incidents or Intensity, QIM, Exchange, OECDgdp) 
 
Where, 
 
Exports = Monthly total merchandise exports of Pakistan 
 
Incidents = No. of monthly terrorist incidents as reported by the Ministry of Interior 
 
Intensity = Monthly total number of killed +injured divided by INCDNTS. 
 
QIM = Monthly Quantum Index of Manufacturing 
 
Exchange = Average Monthly Pak Re/US $ exchange rate 
 
OECDgdp= Quarterly GDP of OECD countries 
 
        
4.3. Exploratory Analysis 
 
The above indicators are plotted against time as shown in figures 4.1 to 4.6. The descriptive 
summary of trends is as follows:-  The no of monthly terrorists attacks (Incidents) fluctuate over 
time with a rising trend, and a steep rise in the first half of 2009. The trend of intensity of 
attacks in terms of total number of casualties (injured + killed) per terrorist attack plotted in Fig 
2, fluctuates around a narrow band except a significant spike in later half of 2008. This was 
mainly due to casualties from the terrorist attack on Marriot hotel in Islamabad in the last 
quarter of 2008.  Monthly exports exhibit a flat trend except short-lived rising trend in first half 
of 2008.  Quantum Index of manufacturing show a bi-modal distribution in a period of 36 
months and discounting for these two spikes, the index is almost flat.  The exchange rate 
declined steeply during the entire 2008.  The quarterly OECDgdp shows a rising trend with 
steep decline from latter half of 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1-4.6 
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Table 4.1 and 4.2 give the descriptive statistics and correlations of/among indicators chosen for 
analysis.  On average 65 terrorist attacks have occurred per month during the analysis period.  
In terms of fatalities, on the average 7 persons were injured plus killed during each attack.  
Compared to other economic indicators these two variables have the highest and second 
highest variability.  Terrorist attacks have increased at a monthly compound growth rate of 6.6 
percent and average monthly growth is more than twice at 14.5 percent. 
 
Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Mean C.V MCGR AMGR 
Exports 1.49 12.75 0.35 0.90 
Exchange 67.23 12.52 0.82 0.86 
QIM 205.11 7.60 0.11 0.26 
Incidents 65.61 60.61 6.64 14.50 
Intensity 6.94 88.47 3.51 33.74 
OECDgdp 32.65 1.69 -0.02 -0.02 
                MCGR=Monthly Compound growth rate 
                AMGR=Average Monthly Growth rate 
 
The growth in monthly average intensity is 33 percent compared to the monthly compound 
rate of just 3.5 percent.  The rest of the variables exhibit monthly growth rates of less than 1 
percent.   The correlations among the 6 indicators suggest absence of multicollinearity with 
correlation between incidents and exchange rate depreciation the highest at 0.66.  Similarly the 
correlation between monthly exports and quarterly OECDgdp is the second highest at 0.58.  The 
absence of multicollinearity among variables in a estimated model will increase the reliability of 
individual impacts including terrorist attacks on export performance. 
 
     Table 4.2. Correlation Matrix 
 
VARIABLES Exports Incidents Intensity QIM Exchange OECDgdp 
Exports 1.00 -0.04 0.17 0.42 -0.03 0.58 
Incidents -0.04 1.00 0.15 -0.13 0.66 -0.38 
Intensity 0.17 0.15 1.00 -0.20 0.30 0.34 
QIM 0.42 -0.13 -0.20 1.00 -0.31 0.40 
Exchange -0.03 0.66 0.30 -0.31 1.00 -0.47 
OECDgdp 0.58 -0.38 0.34 0.40 -0.47 1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4. Search for intensification period 
 
Identifying the structural shift in the intensification of the terrorist attack regime during the 
period is another objective of the study.  The data on these indicators were split into the 
following 3 likely candidates for structural shifts. A) The Lal Masjid incident in mid-2007 gives us 
a pre-12 month period to be compared with 24 month post-Lal Masjid period. B) Death of 
Benazir Bhutto in Dec 2007 splits the 36 month period equally between pre and post- Benazir 
period.  C)  US government’s announcement to shift gear from Iraq to Afghanistan in mid-2008 
is another candidate for structural shift in frequency and intensity of terrorist attacks. Thus 24 
month prior to this announcement is considered a pre intensification period and a 12 month 
period, i.e., July 2008 to June 2009 is considered a post-intensification period. 
 
Table 4.3. Identifying Intensification Regime 
 
 Important Indicators/Averages 
Factors Period 1(Jul07-Jun09) Period2(Jan08-Jun09) Period3(Jul2008-Jul09 
Incidents Pre  36.17 47.16 48.79 
Post 80.33 84.05 99.25 
T Value 3.65 3.11 4.45 
Intensity Pre  2.87 5.15 5.37 
Post 8.99 8.74 10.09 
T Value 3.15 1.80 2.29 
Exports Pre  1.41 1.42 1.50 
Post 1.53 1.56 1.47 
T Value 1.78 2.26 0.39 
QIM Pre  205.40 203.86 209.56 
Post 204.97 206.36 196.22 
T Value 0.07 0.47 2.61 
Exchange Pre  60.63 60.67 61.59 
Post 70.52 73.78 78.50 
T Value 3.95 7.50 19.85 
OECDgdp Pre  32.25 32.47 32.63 
Post 32.55 32.44 32.10 
T Value 1.60 0.16 3.06 
 
Table 4.3 gives the results of performing two-sample (as defined by the timing of the above 
incidents in War on Terror and designated as pre- and post the relevant period) t-test on the 
variables of interest.  
 
Intensification Period 1, July 2007-June 2009: The variables incidents, exports, intensity and 
exchange rate are statistically different from the earlier period. Adopting another criteria i.e., 
relative absolute gap in the averages, only intensity has the highest gap between the two 
periods. 
 
Intensification Period 2, January 2008-June 2009: The variables incidents, exports and exchange 
rate are statistically different from the earlier period. However, only exports have the highest 
relative absolute gap among the averages. this period is identified as variable WOTDUM2 in the 
multivariate analysis. 
 
Intensification Period 3, July 2008-June 2009: Except exports, all other variables are significantly 
different in their values in post-intensification from the early 24 month period.  Moreover in 
this period, 4 variables i.e., terrorist attacks, quantum index of manufacturing, exchange rate 
and GDP of OECD countries have the highest absolute relative gap among the calculated 
averages.  
 
Thus the above simple exercise suggests that period 3 is not only different in terms of increase 
in frequency of attacks but also different in terms of economic environment facing the country.  
However the impact on exports in this period is not as severe as expected a priori. 
 
4.5. Modeling the impact of terrorist attacks 
 
In a reduced modeling framework, a priori terrorist attacks can impact on exports with or 
without a lag.  Moreover, a terrorist attack may even increase exports during the week\month 
it occurs as exporters anticipating further attacks may try their best to ship existing orders in 
advance.  However, once the news spread and future trade is affected, exports may decline and 
adverse impact may outweigh the initial kneejerk positive impact.  
 
An exploratory model with 1-6 month lag in terrorist attack plus the frequency of attacks in the 
current month was included along with the other variables of the basic model specified above 
was estimated.  The results in the appendix.A.2 indicate that terrorist attacks significantly 
impact exports with a 6 month lag.  All other lag terms of terrorist attacks including its 
frequency in the contemporaneous month are statistically not significant. 
 
Table 4.4 shows the results from estimating the model with 6 month lag for terrorist attacks in 
addition to a 2 month lag interacting with an intensification period identified as the post-
Benazir period, i.e., Jan 2008-June 2009 (Incidents(-2)*WOTDUM2) .  Note that not only the lag 
is shorter and therefore the transmission is faster but the impact on exports is more adverse 
than in the pre-Benazir period.  Also all the variables have the correct a priori signs. Observe the 
following from the remaining determinants:- a) A one percent change in last quarter’s OECD 
gdp results in a 4.3 percent change in our monthly exports. B) An anticipated 1 percent change 
next month in depreciation of Pak Re increases current exports by ½ a percent. However it is 
statistically significant only at the 80 percent level.  c) Quantum index of manufacturing and 
exports have a near unitary elasticity, but in post-Benazir era, it increases to more than 1.  
 
 
 
 Table. 4.4. Model for Total Exports: No of Terrorist Attack 
 
Method: Least Square 
Sample (adjusted): 2007M01 2009M05  
Included observations: 29 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -21.455 6.559 -3.271 0.004 
LOG(Exchange(1)) 0.525 0.361 1.452 0.163 
LOG(QIM) 0.933 0.305 3.064 0.006 
LOG(LGOECDgdp) 4.341 1.429 3.037 0.007 
LOG(Incidents(-6)) -0.118 0.044 -2.652 0.016 
LOG(Incidents(-2))*WOTDUM2 -0.149 0.040 -3.716 0.001 
LOG(QIM(-1))*WOTDUM2 0.119 0.036 3.268 0.004 
DUM1208A -0.065 0.024 -2.666 0.015 
MA(1) 0.572 0.038 14.923 0.000 
MA(2) 0.995 0.103 9.640 0.000 
     
     
Adjusted R-squared 0.841     Mean dependent var 0.404 
S.E. of regression 0.053     F-statistic 17.494 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.958     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
 
 
Similar to exploratory model for identifying lags in terrorist attacks, a model is tested for 
assessing the impact of intensity on exports. Appendix A.2 presents results of using 6 lags plus 
the concurrent month intensity of attacks.  Interestingly only the ongoing monthly intensity of 
attacks has an impact on current months’ export performance.  It is only statistically significant 
at the 80 percent level and has the correct sign.  The impact of other variables (except for 
coefficient of QIM) is comparable in magnitude and statistical significance to the corresponding 
model for number of monthly attacks. 
 
Table 4.7 shows the results from estimating the model with concurrent intensity of attacks in 
addition to an interactive dummy of post-Benazir period and 5 month lag in intensity.  In 
contrast to the model estimates with no. of incidents, the impact of intensification due to 
Benazir death on exports is smaller and comes with a delay of 5 months.  All the variables have 
the correct sign and the impact on exports (excluding intensity indicator) is larger than in the 
level model.  The explanatory power is smaller from the previous model. 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.7.Model for Total Export: Intensity 
 
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 2006M12 2009M06  
Included observations: 31 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -27.047 8.226 -3.288 0.003 
LOG(Exchange) 0.645 0.342 1.887 0.072 
LOG(QIM) 1.315 0.315 4.167 0.000 
LOG(OECDgdp) 5.141 1.991 2.582 0.017 
LOG(Intensity) -0.078 0.019 -4.036 0.001 
LOG(Intensity(-5))*WOTDUM2 -0.042 0.017 -2.419 0.024 
MA(1) 0.913 0.051 17.875 0.000 
MA(2) 0.994 0.173 5.735 0.000 
     
     
Adjusted R-squared 0.702     Mean dependent var 0.404 
S.E. of regression 0.070     F-statistic 11.085 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.776     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
 
 
4.5.1. VEC Analysis: 
 
In any multiple variable analysis, the issue of endogeniety comes up. Clearly the variables 
depend on each other. For example, WOT variables put pressure on Pakistan’s exchange rates 
or Quantum Index of manufacturing other than effecting the level of exports. Further more 
exchange rate depreciation effects manufacturng sector by putting down ward pressure on the 
imports of inputs.  For robust empirical estimations it is necessary to run a simultaneous 
equation model. Since the data is time series, it is appropriate to use vector Autoregressive 
model (VAR), which is an extension of univariate Autoregressive (AR) models to capture the 
evolution and interdependencies between multiple time series. We treat all variables in a VAR 
symmetrically by including an equation for each variable explaining its evolution based on its 
own lags and the lags of other variables in the model. The number of equations in a VAR model 
depends upon the number of endogenous variables; each endogenous variable is regressed on 
its own lagged value, and the lagged values of all oither endogenous variables as well as any 
number of exogenous variables. This solves the problem of endogeniety among variables. In 
this sense, VAR model is a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model with lagged variables 
and/or deterministic terms as common regressors so that one can interpret the regression 
results for each equation as ordinary least square estimators.  
 
However if the time series variables have unit root a simple VAR analysis cannot be run. Table 
4.7 shows that all variables have unit root and are stationary at first difference only. In presence 
of unit root, we move to vector error correction model (VECM) where relationship between 
unit root variables can exist if they are cointegrated.  
 
 
Table 4.7.  Augmented Dickey Fuller Test for Unit Roots 
 
Variable Coefficient T-statistics 
DExports (-1) -1.245 -4.075*** 
DQIM (-1) -0.906 -3.402*** 
DExchange (-1) -0.477 -2.430** 
DOECDgdp (-1) -0.968 -3.479*** 
DIncidents (-1) -1.244 -4.251*** 
DIntensity (-1) -1.362 -5.7888*** 
                     Where ***, **, * represents significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
The estimated form of the cointegrating equation with trend which also refers to long term β’ 
coefficients is as follows:  
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Alternatively the estimated equation can be written as follows 
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Where Exports is exports of Pakistan in US dollars term, QIM is quantum index of 
manufacturing, Exchange is exchange rate of Pakistan in terms of Pakistan rupees, OECDgdp is 
gdp of OECD countries in terms of dollars, and Trend is the trend variable, whereas WOT 
represents war on terror proxies (Number of incidence, Killed, Injured or Intensity).  
 
Table 4.8 provides results for Incidents.  Both Quantum Index of Manufacturing and Incidents 
are insignificant in column 1. Figures 4.7-4.8 provides the clue for selecting optimal lag orders 
for the variables to achieve significance. Both figures below are impulse response functions of 
Incidents on Exports and QIM. Figure 4.7 shows that upto 2 lags there is positive relationship 
between exports and number of Incidents. Exports start to decline only after the second month 
as a response to a terrorist attack. Column 2 of table 4.8 provides results with Incidents 
regressed at 2 lags. Now there is a significant and negative relationship between Exports and 
Incidents. However QIM now enters the equation significantly but with a wrong sign.  
 
Figure 4.8 reveals the possible reason behind this observation. There is a strong correlation 
between Incidents and QIM from 2nd month of impact to 5th month. Only after the 5th month 
the correlation subside down. The spurious results for QIM in column 2 of table 8 may be due 
to this correlation. Extending the lag of Incidents to 5 (see column 3 of table 4.8) solves the 
problem. All variables are significantly related with Exports and with right signs. Another 
important observation that can be made in table 8 is that OECD gdp has the highest impact on 
Pakistan’s export potential. We know that Europe and USA are one of Pakistan’s top exporting 
destinations thus their economic performance effects Pakistan’s exporting capabilities. 
 
 
Table 4.8. Long Run Relationship (β’s) for VEC with Incidents 
  
Endogenous Dependent Variable : Exports 
Endogenous 
Independent 
Variables 
 
Minus β’s 
 
 1 2 3 
QIM (-1) -0.0019 -0.0049 0.018 
 (-1.26) (-3.97)*** (3.93)***
Exchange (-1) 0.033 0.0103 0.028 
 (4.00)*** (1.84)* (2.33)***
OECDgdp (-1) 0.414 0.252 0.522 
 (6.78)*** (6.58)*** (4.99)***
Incidents (-1) -0.001   
 (-1.18)   
Incidents (-2)  -0.007  
  (-7.44)***  
Incidents (-5)   -0.017 
   (-3.13)***
trend -0.018 0.010 0.033 
 (-2.75)*** (2.07)** (2.09)**
VEC (p) (1) (1) (1) 
 
 
***, **, * represents significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, VEC(p) represents  
the co integration order. 
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Similar VEC regressions are carried out for Killed, Injured and Intensity and the results are 
provided in table 4.9 (see Appendix-2). Impulse response function helps to provide guidance 
for the choice of optimal lag length for these WOT variables. For example, column 3 in table 4.9 
provides results for Killed with lag 1. All variables except QIM have right signs and are 
significant. Figure 10 suggests that correlation between QIM and Killed subside down at lag 3. 
For Killed (-3), in column 4 of table 9, the results show that all variables have right signs with 
QIM now positively and significantly related with Exports. Figure 4.11 suggests that number of 
injured from a terrorist attack decrease exports after the 2nd year while figure 4.12 shows that 
correlation between QIM and Injured subside down at lag 5.  Table 4.9 gives results for Injured 
at lags 1, 2, and 5, For lags 1 and 2 Injured is negatively and significantly related with Exports 
fitting our model expectations. The last columns 9 and 10 of table 4.9 give results for Intensity. 
Though QIM comes out with the wrong sign, all other variables including Intensity are 
significant with right signs.  Impulse response functions carried out in figure 4.13 also suggests 
that Intensity is negatively related with Exports. Furthermore there are no lags involved for 
both Intensity and Killed for their negative effects on Exports suggesting that number of 
casualties in a terrorist attack defines the intensity of the incident more than injured and 
Pakistan’s exports are most sensitive to those incidents in the conflict where casualties are 
higher. These are expected results because casualties in an incident identify the brutal and 
destructive methods of terrorists that they employ in the conflict where incidents are 
dominated by suicide attacks. 
 
Once we have obtained the coefficients for our WOT variables, we quantify the effects of the 
conflict on exports. As noted in table 4.9, we run multiple regressions for each WOT variable 
based on optimal lags. These WOT coefficients are averaged out and then multiplied with their 
respective monthly average scores and export mean to calculate dollar cost per month of the 
conflict. Table 4.10, column 4, provides costs for each variable. Numbers of incidence have the 
highest cost at 815 million dollars a month where as for other variables, average costs range 
from 400 to 500 million dollars a month. While the average cost of all these variables comes 
out to be 564 million dollar a month.  We know that average exports of Pakistan each month 
are worth 1500 million dollars for 2006 to 2009. Our results suggest that Pakistan’s exports are 
short of 500 million dollar each month since WOT has been intensified in 2006.  Over all, the 
yearly losses amount to 6 billion dollars. This is a staggering figure. We know from our earlier 
discussion that Pakistan’s export growth steeply plummeted during the period of the conflict. 
Please remember that the costs are averaged out on monthly basis.  Column 5, table 4.10 also 
calculates per unit costs. Each terrorist incidence lead to 12 million dollar less exports for 
Pakistan. Similarly each person killed in the terrorist attack costs Pakistan 3.4 million dollar 
worth of exports while each injured person costs 1.4 million dollars. The per month overall loss 
of 500 million dollar comes to the better context when we note that on average terrorist 
attacks claim 158 lives a month while any given day there are at least two attacks. By any 
means this makes up for a high intensity conflict that has sever implications for the local 
industry of Pakistan and its exporting capacity.  
 
 
 
Table 4.10: Costs of War on Terror (2006-2009) 
 
WOT 
Variables 
 
Average 
Coefficients 
 
Average 
Monthly 
Score for  
WOT 
Variables 
 
Export Mean 
(million $) 
 
Per Month 
Cost of the 
Conflict 
(million $) 
 
Per Unit 
Cost 
(million $) 
 
 1 2 3 4=1*2*3 5=1*3  
       
Incidence 0.008 65.61 1492 815.75 12.0  
Killed 0.002 157.67 1492 541.06 3.4  
Injured 0.001 333.69 1492 497.86 1.4  
Intensity 0.039 6.949205 1492 404.36   
    
AVERAGE 
Cost: 564.75 
  
 
 
 
Pakistan’s neighboring countries like India and China have been witnessing a steady increase in 
their exports since 2005 when both countries were exporting 761 billion and 100 billion worth 
of goods and services respectively. By 2009 the exports for both countries nearly doubled and 
now stand at 1.2 trillion dollars and 176 billion dollars. In comparison Pakistan could only 
witness a modest growth in its exports for the same period from 16 billion dollars to only 17 
billion dollars. Assuming that Pakistan followed half good a similar trend in its export growth as 
its neighbors; today by any modest estimates Pakistan’s exports would stand at 24 billion 
dollars. There is a deficit of 7 billion dollars only for 2009. Had Pakistan maintained its share of 
0.2 % in world exports, Pakistan total gain for last 3 years amounts to nearly 30 billion dollars 
that is lost due to its falling shares. Our analysis suggest that a significant portion of this loss 
can be explained through the costs Pakistani exports have incurred due to war on terror where 
the approximate loss for last 3 years is around 18 billion dollars amounting to half of Pakistan’s 
over all losses in exports.  
 
For the sample period, there are 2 terrorist attacks every day, whereas on average 5 citizens 
die in these attacks. A single terrorist attack on average costs 12 million dollars and each 
casualty in the conflict costs 3 million dollars in fewer exports. For the intensification period 
post 2008, the figures get more pronounced. For example the number of terrorist attacks and 
casualties increase to 3 and 10, with average losses rising to nearly 800 million dollars a month.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
 
Pakistan’s economy has been underperforming since 2007. Inflationary trends are rising with 
peaks up to 20%. GDP growth rate has gone down to 2% in 2009. FDI has decreased 
significantly. Local investors are rushing abroad and investing in countries like Bangladesh. The 
government is left with no option but to curtail development expenditures amid high fiscal 
deficits and falling tax revenues. Public sector development plans are under utilized because 
government has failed to release funds affecting many infrastructure projects much needed for 
growing population.  
 
There is a lot of academic interest to understand the causes. One cause shared by Pakistan 
with rest of the world is the looming global recession that has caught many a countries. 
However looking at South Asian region, one realizes that countries like India, China and 
Bangladesh have continued with their economic progress unabated. Pakistan’s economic woes 
also have an indigenous dimension. One salient factor is the continuation of war on terror that 
has taken a bloody turn since 2007 where there has been a phenomenal rise in terrorist attacks 
within Pakistani borders affecting all major cities of the country.  War on terror that has 
converted into a low intensity conflict within Pakistan has lead to capital flight  and political 
instability and causing insecurity among private and public agencies with unfavorable 
economic and social outcomes. Despite falling resources, Pakistan’s security related 
expenditures have ballooned. Hundreds of billions are additionally spent on domestic security 
forces like police to equip them with modern technology needed to handle terrorist threats 
nationwide. Pakistan is only second to SriLanka where business costs of terrorism are the 
highest in South Asia. Pakistan also precedes India, Bangladesh and China in the intensity and 
incidence of violence. Currently militancy related casualties are highest for Pakistan within the 
region. 
 
Though a larger economic analysis on the costs of WOT is necessary to understand its overall 
effect on Pakistan, we restrict our analysis to the exporting sector of Pakistan in this report and 
investigate the effects of WOT post 2007. 
 
Export performance of Pakistan’s important sectors has been deteriorating rapidly since 2007. 
For example leather and textiles sector witnessed decline in exports due to deterioration in law 
and order in Balochistan affecting the supply of raw materials.   
 
The logistics costs have increased due to attacks on transportations raising insurance and 
freight rates. There is also an increased movement of transport destined for NATO/ISAF forces 
in Afghanistan causing overall rise in transportation costs as transport is becoming increasingly 
unavailable for conventional trade. Internationally, freight charges have been following but 
Pakistan is trending opposite due to higher risks of delays insured by freight forwarders by 
charging higher overheads. With regular incidents of terrorism, inland transit insurance charges 
are fluctuating upwards.  
 
Outside buyers are reluctant to place orders to Pakistani businessmen due to the uncertainty 
and risk of delays. Pakistani post is already congested due to Afghan bound cargo related 
mostly of NATO/ISAF forces in Afghanistan. Terrorist attacks lead to halt in business activity 
leading to a rush afterwards causing delay in movement of goods to the ports for export.  
 
Foreign imports do not come to Pakistan to place orders because their travel advisories 
prevent then to travel. Even if they are willing to travel, their insurance policies do not cover 
travel for Pakistan anymore due to high risks. A major trade fair arranged by TDAP namely 
EXPO 2010 failed to attract international buyers and exhibitors suggesting significant affects on 
Pakistan’s export promotion capabilities.  Pakistani business travelers are also faced with more 
stringent visa requirements undermining their efforts to market their products internationally. 
 
Overall one may agree that WOT has significantly affected Pakistani exports. The report carries 
out regression analysis where variables like global recession, exchange rate fluctuations are 
taken into account while examining the effects of WOT on Pakistani exports. 
 
This report defines WOT through its outcomes. For example number terrorist attacks and 
people killed and injured in these attacks represent the conflict as well its intensity.   
 
The analysis finds that WOT can be divided into three distinct periods. The LAL Masjid incident 
in mid 2007 marks the first sign of intensification of WOT. The second one is the assassination 
of Benazir Bhutto. The third one comes in 2008 when the US announced to shift gear from Iraq 
to Afghanistan and incumbent government in Pakistan created a political support for armed 
action within Pakistani borders against the terrorists. The analysis finds that WOT has more 
significant affect on Pakistani exports post Benazir assassination.  
 
The report finally calculates the monthly and daily costs of WOT. On average there are 2 
terrorist attacks every day whereas 5 citizens on average die in these attacks. A single terrorist 
attacks costs 12 million dollars to the exports. Post Benazir assassination the costs rise to 18 
million dollars due to increased intensity where not only the death toll on average has risen but 
the number of terrorist attacks have gone up too. Average per month loss in exports due to 
terrorism is calculated to be around 500 million dollars.  
 
Pakistan during 2006-2009 has lost nearly 30 billion dollars in exports as its market shares have 
fallen. Part of this loss is explained by WOT, where we calculate that 18 billion dollar accounts 
for it.  
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Appendix A.1 
 
Table 1.6. Suicide Attacks in 2009 
Date Place Target 
NWFP 
4 January  D.I. khan Policemen and government collage 
23 January  Swat Check post 
5 February Mingora , Swat Police station 
9 February Bannu Police and FC check post 
20 february  D.I.Khan Funeral Procession of the care taker of an 
Imambargah (mosque of Shia community) 
23 February Bannu DSP office 
11 march Peshawar ANP minister Bashir Bilour 
26 March Jandola Tank Peace community of Turkistan 
30 March  Bannu Army convoy 
15 April Charsadda Police check post 
18 April Hangu Army check point and convoy 
5 May Bera Qadeem, Peshawar FC check post 
11 May Dera Adam Khel, Kohat FC check post 
21 May Jandola Tank  FC fort 
28 May Matni, Peshawar Police check post 
28 May D.I.Khan Security check post 
5 June Dir Upper Friday prayers in a mosque 
9 June Peshawar PC hotel 
11 June  Peshawar  Police 
12 June  Nowshera Military mosque 
22 June Battgram, Mardan Police check post 
25 July Laki Marwat Police convoy 
15 August Khwazakhela, Swat  Check post 
22 August Kanju, Swat Security forces 
23 August Momin Town, Peshawar Ansar-ul-Islam leader’s house 
30 August Mingora Swat Police training 
12 September Doaba, Hangu Police station 
18 September  Kohat Shia community 
19 Spetember Dara Adam Khel, Kohat Security check post 
26 September Sadar, Peshawar Askari bank 
26 September Bannu Police station 
28 September Bannu Leader of a peace community 
9 October Khyber bazaar, Peshawar Civilian 
12 October Shangla Army convoy 
15 October Kohat  Police station 
16 October Peshawar  CIA office 
28 October Pepal-mandi, Peshawar Civilian 
3 November Lachi, Kohat PF firing range building 
8 November Cattle market in Adezai area, Peshawar Civilian 
9 November Ring road, Peshawar Police 
10 November Farooq-i-Azam Chowk, Charsadda Civilian 
13 November Khyber road, Peshawar ISI’s regional headquarters 
13 november Bakakhel, Bannu Police station 
14 November Pishtakhara intersection, Peshawar Police check post 
16 November Peshawar Police station 
19 November Peshawar Judicial complex 
1 December Kabal, Swat Awami National party’s (ANP) provincial meeting 
7 December Peshawar Session court 
 
 
 
 
 
17 December Isakhel village, Lakki Marwat District Nazim’s hujra 
18 December Timergara, Lower Dir Police lines mosque 
22 December Peshawar Press club 
24 December Arbab road, Sadar, Peshawar Police check post 
   
Tribal Areas 
6 February  Jamrud, Khyber Agency NATO supply trucks 
12 February Landi Kotal Charbagh 
27 March Jamrud, Khyber Agency Mosque? Friday prayers and Khasadar force 
4 April Miranshah, North Waziristan Security Forces’ convoy 
28 July  Miranshah, North Waziristan Khasadar check post 
18 August Miranshah, North Waziristan Security check post 
27 August Torkham, Khyber Agency Khasadar security post 
   
Balochistan 
2 March Killi Karbala Pashin JUI (F) provincial leadership 
30 june Qalat NATO containers 
   
Punjab 
5 February D.G Khan Procession at Imambargah 
16 March Pirwadhai, Rawal pindi Civilain 
5 April Chawal Imamabargah 
27 May Lahore Police/ ISI 
12 june Lahore Dr. Sarfraz Naeemi 
2 July Choorh Chowk, Rawalpindi Bus of Kahuta Research Laboratory (KRL) 
23 October  Kamra, Attock Pakistan Airforce (PAF) Complex 
24 October Lillah, Kalarkahar, Rawalpindi Officer of an Intelligence agency 
2 November Babu Sabu interchange, Lahore Check post 
4 December Parade lane, Rawalpindi Army Mosque 
7 December Moon market Iqbal town, Lahore (two attacks) Civilian 
8 December Bela Qasim Cantonment area, Multan ISI building 
15 December Khosa market, D.G. Khan Senior Adviser to Punjab Chief Minister 
   
Sindh/ Karachi 
27 December Orangi Town, Karachi Muharram Procession  
   
Azad Kashmir 
26 June Muzaffarabad Army Barracks 
27 December Muzaffarabad Muharram procession 
   
Islamabad 
23 March Sitara Market, Islamabad Police station 
4 April Margala Road, E-7, Islamabad FC check post  
6 June G-8/4, Islamabad Rescue 15 
5 October F-7, islamabad UNWFP office 
20 October H-10, Islamabad (two attacks) International Islamic University 
2 December E-8 Sector, Islamabad Pakistan naval Complex 
24 December Shakrial, Islamabad Imamabargah 
Appendix A.2 
 
Table 4.5. 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(TEXPT)  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 2007M01 2009M06  
Included observations: 30 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     
C -30.639 10.014 -3.060 0.007 
LOG(XCHNGRT) 0.518 0.391 1.325 0.204 
LOG(QIM) 1.537 0.455 3.377 0.004 
LOG(LGOECDGDP) 5.977 2.266 2.638 0.018 
LOG(INCDNTS) 0.076 0.061 1.250 0.229 
LOG(INCDNTS(-1)) 0.057 0.041 1.417 0.176 
LOG(INCDNTS(-2)) 0.018 0.059 0.298 0.770 
LOG(INCDNTS(-3)) 0.016 0.058 0.278 0.785 
LOG(INCDNTS(-4)) -0.014 0.059 -0.245 0.809 
LOG(INCDNTS(-5)) -0.042 0.046 -0.920 0.371 
LOG(INCDNTS(-6)) -0.157 0.069 -2.263 0.038 
DUM1208 -0.037 0.051 -0.723 0.480 
MA(1) 0.499 0.069 7.223 0.000 
MA(2) 0.995 0.099 10.028 0.000 
     
     
Adjusted R-squared 0.748 Mean dependent var 0.404 
S.E. of regression 0.065 F-statistic 7.630 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.716 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4.6. 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(TEXPT)  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 2007M01 2009M06  
Included observations: 30 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -24.076 9.975 -2.414 0.028 
LOG(XCHNGRT) 0.432 0.388 1.114 0.282 
LOG(QIM) 0.887 0.319 2.781 0.013 
LOG(LGOECDGDP) 5.198 2.472 2.103 0.052 
LOG(INTENSITY) -0.048 0.036 -1.330 0.202 
LOG(INTENSITY(-1)) 0.018 0.028 0.652 0.524 
LOG(INTENSITY(-2)) -0.023 0.033 -0.703 0.492 
LOG(INTENSITY(-3)) -0.015 0.030 -0.509 0.618 
LOG(INTENSITY(-4)) -0.018 0.029 -0.599 0.558 
LOG(INTENSITY(-5)) -0.003 0.022 -0.127 0.900 
LOG(INTENSITY(-6)) -0.013 0.024 -0.533 0.602 
DUM0809 0.039 0.050 0.787 0.443 
MA(1) 1.034 0.053 19.666 0.000 
MA(2) 0.995 0.097 10.224 0.000 
     
     
Adjusted R-squared 0.733     Mean dependent var 0.404 
S.E. of regression 0.067     F-statistic 7.123 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.236     Prob (F-statistic) 0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.9: Long Run Relationship (β’s) for VEC with Killed, Injured and Intensity 
  
Endogenous Dependent Variable : Exports 
Endogenous 
Independent  
Variables 
 
Minus β’s 
 
 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
QIM (-1) 
 
-0.002 
 
0.0064 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.005 
 
0.096 
 
-0.0014 
 
-0.0003 
 (-2.00)** (1.82)* (1.79)* (-2.37)** (0.31) (-1.54) (0.19) 
Exchange (-1) 0.028 0.197 0.038 0.091 -1.29 0.028 0.070 
 (5.72)*** (2.29)** (6.35)*** (5.55)*** (-0.28) (6.11)*** (5.02)*** 
OECDgdp (-1) 0.395 2.02 0.455 1.025 -10.408 0.431 0.921 
 (10.37)*** (2.41)*** (9.92)*** (6.39)*** (-0.28) (11.66)*** (6.039)*** 
Killed (-1) -0.0006       
 (-7.24)***       
Killed (-3)  -0.004      
  (-2.106)**      
Injured (-1)   -0.0002     
   (-3.31)***     
Injured (-2)    -0.001    
    (-5.13)***    
Injured (-5)     -0.002   
     (-0.29)   
Intensity (-1)      -0.021  
      (-8.01)***  
Intensity (-3)       -0.057 
       (4.56)*** 
trend -0.013 -0.063 -0.020 -0.029 0.77 -0.012 -0.021 
 (-3.98)*** (-2.16)** (-4.88)*** (-4.38)*** (0.29) (4.21)*** (0.006) 
VAR (p) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) 
***, **, * represents significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, VEC(p) represents the co integration order. 
 
 
 
